Metaminds: Using metarepresentation to model minds in translation by Sturm, Annegret
Chapter 16
Metaminds: Using metarepresentation
to model minds in translation
Annegret Sturm
University of Geneva
Addressing the other is fundamental to translation studies. Language is the unique
human capacity for interaction by transferring meaning, emotions and attitudes
to another mind. The translator has to understand the auther’s intentions behind
the communication in order to correctly interpret and adapt her message for the
target audience. One of the most interesting features of translation is this double
metarepresentation of author and audience.
The aim of this paper is (1) to conceptualise translation as higher-order metarep-
resentation and (2) to show empirically that the permanent taking and giving of
other’s perspectives shapes the translator’s mind.
I shall begin with outlining why translation is an intensive mental interaction, and
how previous literature has dealt with the translator’s mental interaction with the
two others. After introducing the concept of attributive metacognition, or Theory
of Mind (ToM), I shall review the literature on how translation trains attributive
metacognition. If translation really is such a highly demanding task in terms of at-
tributive metacognition, translators should have a better ToM than non-translators.
I set up an fMRI experiment to study this question.
The results show an important activation in the precuneus for both groups. La-
belled as “the mind’s eye” (Fletcher et al. 1995), the precuneus is the region that
subserves the representation of the self in relationship with the outside world (Ca-
vanna & Trimble 2006) as well as perspectives contrary to our own (Bruneau &
Saxe 2010).
1 Introduction
From the outside, translation seems to be a rather lonely activity: The translator
interacts with text and hardly ever with other individuals. Bizarrely, however,
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translators experience their work as highly interactional. They call their activ-
ity “an act of supreme empathy” (Simic, in Kelly & Zetzsche (2012: 107), “an act
of love” (Steiner, in Kelly & Zetzsche 2012: 213) and “a valuable way of coming
closer” (Bassnett 2002: 119). These individual experiences hint at the hidden char-
acter of translation as social activity on the mental meta-level.
The following sections present different models of translation to show that
translation has always been considered a phenomenon on the meta-level, be it
textual or communicative. The main point of this paper is to extend this view to
include metacognition and in particular, to consider competences in attributive
metacognition as one of the core components of translation competence.
Translation involves many competences at the meta-level (Plassard 2007). In
the late 1970ies, translation scholars started to think of translation as a metatext
(Popovic 1976). As a textual reaction to prior text, translation was similar to
reader’s letters to the editor (Popovic 1976: 232). The translator is thus a reader
who reacts to prototext. But in contrast to other readers, the translator’s reaction
is a reproduction of the original. The communicative impact of the newly created
metatext , however, depends entirely on the reader’s frame of reference (Popovic
1976: 230). As a reader who recreates the text s/he has just perceived for other
readers, the translator’s capacity to anticipate their frames of reference is crucial
for the communication.
Indeed, translation was soon to be considered as an act of communication in-
stead of a textual genre. In 1978, John Bigelow conceptualised translation as a
form of indirect speech. Ever since, this is one of the most frequently used ap-
proaches to model the translation process. The language switch becomes a sec-
ondary and not necessarily defining feature of translation. For the philosopher
Donald Davidson, sameness of meaning exists independent of language on the
level of the language user (Davidson 2010: 125). Since every language provides
means for indirect speech, every language user must have the cognitive possibil-
ities for interpreting indirect communication. Communication across languages
is hence possible because everybody who can understand and produce monolin-
gual indirect communication has the necessary cognitive means for understand-
ing and producing multilingual indirect communication.
Translation is possible because it does not require any special mental equip-
ment that would not be used in inferential communication in general (Gutt 2000:
200). But then what makes translation different frommonolingual standard com-
munication, if not the language switch? According to Relevance Theory, stan-
dard inferential communication is characterised by the so-called mutual cogni-
tive environment, i.e. shared information between the interlocutors. Experts in a
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specific field, like engineering, share a mutual cognitive environment: engineer-
ing. Similarly, a conference interpreter shares a mutual cognitive environment
with his/ her audience, in form of the conference they are attending. Within this
mutual cognitive environment, “a piece of informationwill be taken as part of the
intended context if it is the most accessible information that yields an adequately
relevant interpretation” (Gutt 2004: 2).
By definition translation brings people with different mutual environments to-
gether (Gutt 2004: 5). As a secondary communication situation it lacks a mutual
cognitive environment. Translator, source text author and reader do not share
the same frame of reference because they are separated in space and time. In
the translation process, the author’s intentions have to be interpreted although
they may not be explicitly stated in the text. These intentions have to be con-
sidered while rendering the text for the target public, a process for which it is
also important to anticipate the target public’s prior knowledge of the subject
and the extent to which the author’s aims and intentions consequently have to
be adapted in order to be correctly communicated in the other language.
As second-order metacommunicative representations, translations should en-
tail second-order metacognitive representations. A second-order metarepresen-
tation is a metarepresentation standing for another metarepresentation. The first
meta-representation, the source text, is already a higher-order representation
since it stands for the author’s ideas. The translator’s primary concern is thus
not the representation of a state of affairs, “but the metarepresentation of bodies
of thought” (Gutt 2004: 13).
A metarepresentation is not a copy or duplication of a thought. Rather, trans-
lation is a transformation of metarepresentations. The source text is the only
material basis for the generation of the translator’s mental representation of the
target text. The creation of the target text happens in the reverse order. It starts
with the translator’s purely mental representation of the author’s mental repre-
sentation as represented in the source text. During the translation process, this
mental metarepresentation is materialised in form of the target text. Translation
briefs and technical guidelines offer indications both about author intentions and
the background of the target audience. Such documentation is, however, not a
default setting of translation. First, consider cases where this type of informa-
tion is lacking, like in the case of dead authors. How does one translate “a dead
person, or a living person whom you never meet, or who never corresponds
with you or your editor or your publisher in the attempt to control your work?”
(Robinson 2001: 24). Second, the presence of extensive documentation does not
exclude that theymay be conflicting with the translator’s views about author and
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audience. Finally, such documentation does not necessarily reduce the metarep-
resentational effort. To the contrary, it may even increase it since the translator
has to add these “external” considerations about author and audience to the own
assumptions of their respective cognitive environments. Instead of comparing
the reference frameworks of two interlocutors and finding possible overlaps, the
translator may end up juggling with the additional reference framework of the
authors responsible for the technical documentation and translation brief. Given
these possible complications, I shall treat the translation process in what follows
as a simple chain of text production and re-production between author, transla-
tor and audience. Metacognition is a central feature of this process.
Representing the minds of others is central to translation (Wilss 1992). Tradi-
tionally, this feature of the translator’s work has been studied in terms of imita-
tion, empathy, metempsychosis and simulation. For Reiss and Vermeer, transla-
tion “simulates a primary information offer” (1991: 88). For them, translation is an
“imitative action including the entire person” (1991: 91). Other translation schol-
ars have pointed out that translation is “inevitably mimetic” (Mossop 1998: 249),
i.e. that it is always geared toward imitation (Mossop 1983; 1998; Folkart 1991;
Gutt 2000; Hermans 2007). Another key concept in this context is metempsy-
chosis (Dussart 1994: 108). This rather spiritual idea that one soul animates dif-
ferent bodies has been taken to explain the “magnetism” between translator and
author (Wuilmart 1990: 241). The term “empathy” has been used to describe the
intuitive understanding between author and translator, a process that precedes
rational understanding or goes beyond it (Dussart 1994: 109). Folkart refers to
recreation by translation as the ultimate form of mimetism (1991:418), and Stolze
qualifies a full mimesis as the unreachable ideal of translation (2010: 144). These
concepts are seriously limited. Firstly, many of them cannot be used as parame-
ters for empirical translation studies since they arise from traditional theoretical
approaches to translation such as aesthetics. Furthermore, most of these con-
cepts express rather general ideas. There is no translation-specific definition of
“imitation” or “empathy”. Different authors may use them to refer to different
concepts. It is thus not very clear whether, in the context of Translation Studies,
“imitation” and “mimesis” are to be thought of as distinct concepts. Similarly, it
is unclear whether “empathy” and “intuition” cover the same phenomena and
mechanisms.
Modelling the translation process in terms of metarepresentations has at least
three advantages. Metarepresentation provides a simple, yet powerful model of
translation as a special form of inferential communication. It links up with pre-
vious research on metatexts and metacommunication, and accommodates them
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together with metacognition in a coherent framework. In this framework, trans-
lation is defined as a metacommunicative process generating metatexts. These
texts are secondary communication situations about previous text. Generating
them requires higher-order metarepresentation. These second-order metarepre-
sentations should at least partially account for the cognitive effort in translation.
Furthermore, translators who are constantly operating on this higher metacog-
nitive level should develop a higher cognitive proficiency than non-translators.
I study these questions with the help of recent evidence from social psychology
about attributive metacognition, or Theory of Mind (ToM).
2 Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind (ToM) describes the ability to represent and attribute mental
states (such as beliefs, desires and intentions) to oneself and others (Saxe et al.
2004). It refers to “our ability to reflect on ourselves and become self-conscious,
and our ability to reflect on others and become conscious of the way others may
see us. It involves thinking about how information is represented to us in terms
of beliefs, desires and goals. Theory of mind is necessary for understanding the
social world and our part in it” (Larkin 2010: 31). It allows us to make sense of
others’ behaviour and predict their future actions. Investigations into how the
mind works have a long tradition in Western philosophy. For a long time, Theo-
ries about the Mind dealt with questions about how the mind could access itself
– as the only means to study one’s thinking was to think about it. While there
is a substantive body of research on how the mind deals with numbers, symbols
and language, the research about the mental framework that deals with other
minds is comparatively young. It is only in recent years that scientists with such
diverse backgrounds like social psychology, neurosciences, anthropology and lin-
guistics became interested in metacognition. Papers on neuroimagery research
on Theory of Mind have increased from four in 2000 to more than 400 in 2013
(Koster-Hale & Saxe 2013).
The interest in mental state attribution began in 1978, when Premack and
Woodruff used the term “theory of mind” outside of philosophy to answer the
question whether chimpanzees have a system of mental state attribution. They
define the concept of theory of mind as the attribution of mental states to oneself
and others. For their paper in particular, this idea applies beyond the boundaries
of biological species. Their research consisted in presenting chimpanzees with a
series of videotaped scenes showing human actors struggling with a variety of
problems. After each video, the chimpanzee was presented with a picture fea-
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turing a possible solution to the problem. For example, one picture proposed a
stick to reach for a banana which was too far away for the protagonist. The chim-
panzees were consistently chose the photographs with the correct solution to the
problem, which led the authors to infer that the animals were able to attribute a
mental state to the actor (e.g. the desire to have the banana) and understand that
they would regulate their behaviour according to their mental states. Although
the study has received fundamental criticism (Call & Tomasello 2008), it did not
only spark the interest in the subject, but led the philosopher Daniel Dennett to
think about other possible research designs for ToM testing (1978). Acknowledg-
ing that a fully-fledgedTheory of mind was rather difficult to test, he asserts that
the required conditions are easily met by communicative acts, such as warning,
requesting or asking (ibid). While modern research is convinced that preverbal
infants, apes and monkeys share any of the fundamental capacities of human
social cognition, a fully-fledged Theory of Mind remains, like the sophisticated
use of language, part of the uniquely human social cognition.
The mature ToM network seems to be universal. Without any pre-existing
neuroscience of ToM and unusually few preconceptions about its possible neu-
ral counterparts, every group that sought to identify brain regions implicated in
ToM got essentially the same answer (Saxe 2010). Activation in the same brain
regions is found in participants ranging from 5 to 65 years of age from diverse re-
gions of the world (Britain, USA, Japan, Germany, China, Netherlands and Italy)
and in congenitally blind and deaf adults (Koster-Hale & Saxe 2013). To be so
widely shared, neural substrates of ToM have to be similar in all these popula-
tions, and hence independent of the particular circumstances of their lives.
The regions reliably activated by ToM tasks are the right temporo-parietal junc-
tion (RTPJ) and the medial-prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the precuneus (PC) and the
superior temporal sulcus (STS; Koster-Hale & Saxe 2013; Dodell-Feder et al. 2011;
Saxe 2010; Young et al. 2010; Atique 2010; Saxe 2009). All these brain regions
have been identified through fMRI, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and
lesion studies (Saxe 2009).
But ToM is no default setting of the mind one is born with. It develops through-
out childhood and undergoes significant changes until adolescence (Gunther
Moor et al. 2012; Cummings 2009).
Experience with diverse mental contents in language switch situations could
help bilingual children to develop ToM competencies earlier than monolinguals
(Kovacs 2009). This argument is twofold: bilingual children do not only have
experience with two languages, but also with mixing them both and switching
from one language to another. A situation involving a language switch implies
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knowing that one of the communication partners does not understand one of
the languages. Frequent exposure to such situations would lead to enhanced
ToM capacities. Alternatively, the bilingual’s experience with controlling multi-
ple languages and adapt their use according to their environment could enhance
the development of their executive control – which in turn would enable them
to perform better on ToM tasks that require such abilities (Kovacs 2009). There
is evidence that bilingual children know that and when interlocutors may not
understand one of the child’s languages (cf. Bassnett 2002). Children learn to ad-
dress their communication partners in the appropriate language before the age of
three (ibid). Growing up with two languages confronts bilingual children more
often with conflicting mental representations. A bilingual child has to learn that
a monolingual friend does not understandwhat is being said in the child’s second
language. In a larger bilingual context, bilingual children have even been found
mediating actively between two monolinguals by helping them by translating
for them (Kovacs 2009). Bilingual children grow up with multiple referents for
objects. Whereas monolingual children only assign two labels to an object at
around the age of 4, bilinguals do so much earlier (Kovacs 2009). Yet, there is
no evidence suggesting that bilingual children may have advances language abil-
ities. Kovacs (2009) did not find any relation between the vocabulary scores and
the ToM performance of bilingual children. Similarly, bilingual children perform
better than their monolingual peers in false belief tasks and ToM tasks involving
a language switch, without showing an advantage for either task. Kovacs (2009)
concludes that bilingualism enhances cross-domain performances.
The influence of several languages may go beyond purely linguistic domains
as bilingual individuals are at the same time bicultural. In an fMRI study by
Kobayashi Frank et al. (2008), Japanese (L1) and English (L2) bilingual children
and adults were presented with false belief task in both languages. Whereas chil-
dren’s brain activation showed an overlap of activity for the L1 and L2 conditions,
the brain activation patterns of adults varied depending on the task language.
The results indicate that individuals recruit different neural resources depending
on the language context, and that this difference may become greater with age.
An alternative interpretation is that the different activation patterns are induced
by the influence of participants’ cultural background on their social cognition.
Cultural influences can be found in terms of childrearing, mother-child interac-
tion patterns and the way behaviour is explained to children (Kobayashi Frank
& Temple 2009).
Up to now, no systematic difference has been found in the development of
ToM abilities depending on the child’s mother tongue (Zufferey 2010: 46). Sim-
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ilarly, bilingual and monolingual children achieve linguistic milestones at the
same time. It is thus unlikely that a possible linguistic advantage alone could
explain the superior performance of bilinguals in ToM tasks.
Van Overwalle (2009) proposes a comprehensive list of ToM tasks used in 200
fMRI studies, mainly published between January 2000 and April 2007. Among
the tasks he identifies are: viewing tasks, tasks requiring imitation, a causal pre-
diction or causality judgement.
Non-verbal stimuli involve pictures of human faces, enacted human actions,
comics and picture stories. Methodologies involving non-verbal stimuli include
gaze tracking and non-verbal answers, e.g. by pushing buttons. In the so-called
“Mind in the Eyes” test participants are presented with a series of 25 photographs
of the eye-region of the face of different actresses and actors (Baron-Cohen et al.
2001). The picture is accompanied by four descriptive terms and participants have
to select the one that offers the best description of the person’s mental state.
Themost frequently used verbal stimuli are short stories and sentences. One of
the earliest and often used test stimuli is the Strange Stories test by Happé (1994).
The stories were originally designed as naturalistic tool for the diagnosis of spe-
cific ToM impairments in patients with autism. The original Strange Stories test
consisted of 24 vignettes comprising 12 different types of stories with two stories
for each type. The 12 different story types depict common elements of communi-
cation or communication situations, such as: lie, white lie, joke, pretend, misun-
derstanding, persuade, discrepancies between appearance and reality, figures of
speech, sarcasm, forget, double bluff and contrary emotions. Adapted versions of
the task contain stories on human mental and physical states as well as physical
states of animals (White et al. 2009). FMRI item analyses reveal that activation
of the ToM network does not depend on the linguistic features of the stimuli
(Dodell-Feder et al. 2011). These findings suggest that the examined verbal ToM
stimuli work independent of language – and languages.
Applying the ToM concept to translator’s metarepresentation of other minds
has several benefits. Unlike the previously mentioned concepts, ToM has been
investigated thoroughly in numerous contexts, across several cultural and lin-
guistic groups, covering all ages from early childhood to adulthood. ToM is as-
sociated with a robust activation pattern in fMRI studies, which is rare for com-
paratively complex cognitive phenomena. This activation pattern is independent
of language. Furthermore, mother tongues do not seem to have an influence on
ToM development.
While both mono- and bilingual children reach the different stages of their
ToM development at the same time, bilingual children have shown to score bet-
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ter in ToM tasks than their monolingual peers. This difference is not necessarily
explained by the fact that they speak different languages, but by how they use
their languages. Children growing up in a bilingual environment frequently en-
counter situations in which they have to decide which type of verbal behaviour
is most appropriate for their given audience: switching from one language to an-
other because the audience does not share the same language; ormixing language
because all parts of the audience share the same languages as the interlocutor,
or translating what is said for the part of the audience that does not understand
one of the languages used. Regular inferences on the content of other minds tak-
ing part in any given communication situation, and adapting one’s behaviour to
those inferences could help bilinguals to acquire ToM more efficiently than their
monolingual peers.
These observations make ToM a relevant concept for translation. Unlike the
previously presented traditional concepts, ToM provides a model for empirical
research. Linking existing research about the understanding of others in human
communication in general with findings from Translation Studies will deepen
our understanding of translation as a specialised form of human communication.
Given that ToM is associated with a robust brain activation pattern, research
about the role of ToM in translation could constitute one of the first steps into
researching the neurological mechanisms of translation which are still one of the
chief known unknowns of translation studies (Tymoczko 2012: 83). The following
section presents evidence for the role of attributive metacognition in translation,
and reasons why translation is likely to train this particular competence.
3 Theory of Mind in translation
The translator’s task does not tolerate any approximate use of language. Text cre-
ation based on prior text requires highly conscious choice of words, information
structure and stylistic devices. The two main tasks of translation are reading and
writing. Both activities have been shown to increase attributive metacognition.
Finally, translation training in classroom settings also leads to greater metacog-
nitive competences.
Translating for other people is a formidable way to get experience with the
way other speakers use their words and phrases. Translation involves a more
conscious language use than direct monolingual standard communication when
one speaks on behalf of oneself. “I never realised what an imprecise word ‘clear’
was until I tried to translate it”, says linguist Arika Okrent (2010: 67) about her
experience with translation. In spontaneous speech, we can use language with-
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out knowing what we want to say from the beginning; we can figure it out as we
go along. Translators, in contrast, always have to know precisely what it is they
are saying when they translate.
Using several languages also entails a certain familiarity with different social
conventions. Work by Shatz et al. (2006) shows that translators manipulate the
expression of mental states in translation. For their study, Shatz and colleagues
(2006) developed a technique they call “double translation”: two bilinguals trans-
late two versions of a book, the source text and a published translation. By
comparing their work with the official translations, “non-native researchers (…)
could note when the professional translators had translated something in a way
that seemed unusual to them” (2006: 96). Results of the study show that many
modifications in the translations are motivated by culture-specific practices and
beliefs. This shows that translators are sensitive to the culture-specific cues of
mental states. In dealing with a particular mental state, translators reflect com-
mon beliefs or practices in a given culture. That is, they infer the mental state
in question and adapt it to the social conventions of the target text culture. The
increased demand in social reasoning imposed by the task is one of many factors
influencing metacognitive abilities in translation.
Indirect communication trains perspective-taking capacities (Djikic et al. 2013).
Among the best examples for the power of indirect communication are literature
and narration. As soon as the reader starts engaging with the story, his/ her mind
is almost automatically pulled out of his/ her actual present situation into the life
of others. Reading means accessing this abstract, yet high concentration of social
life. Reading means mind-reading.
Reading literary fiction has been found to improve ToM (Djikic & Oatley 2014).
The more people read, the better they score on ToM tests (Djikic & Oatley 2014).
Literature is the indirect experience of the other. Literature can be persuasive
and lead the reader into an indirect communication with the characters. More
generally, however, one of the main traits of literature is its subject matter. Lit-
erary writings deal with selves and their interactions in the social world (Djikic
& Oatley 2014). The reader is taken to adopt the perspective of another and live,
at least partially, through their experiences.
Translation and narration are based on the same principle: the willing suspen-
sion of disbelief (Pym 1998). Although the translator is not the CEO of a bank,
s/he will have to write the address to the reader in the annual report as if s/he
was. In translation, both language comprehension and production require the
willing suspension of disbelief which makes writing for translation yet another
exercise in indirect communication. Individuals who have been writing fiction
for several years scored higher on ToM tests (Djikic et al. 2013: 17).
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Translation involves a great share of reading, writing and hence confronta-
tion with different types of higher language use, such as irony. Like narration,
translation helps to understand language and the human mind as representa-
tional devices of cognition. Reading and writing are proven to train attributive
metacognition. Reading also increases evaluative metacognitive skills such as
self-monitoring and control skills (Larkin 2010: 74).
Translation comes intuitively to mind as one of the best ways to engage people
in perspective-taking. The psychologists Emile Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe 2012
tested members of two conflict groups in a perspective-giving and perspective-
taking paradigm. Two roles were assigned to participants of each group, Sender
and Responder. In the perspective-giving task, participants with a Sender-role
had to write a brief description about difficulties and challenges of their respec-
tive situation. Responders were told that the brief was a translation they had to
verify. They had to summarize the Sender’s statement in their own words, but
without expressing their own beliefs, feelings and experiences. According to the
authors, “describing the difficulties and challenges experienced by the outgroup
in one’s own words is a novel and robust implementation of perspective-taking”,
since it requires the Responder “to at least partially get ‘inside’ the Sender’s de-
scription” (Bruneau et al. 2012: 856).
Classroom experience with translation also trains perspective-taking capaci-
ties. Salles Rocha (2010) analysed whether translation activities help second lan-
guage learners to become aware of the L2 perspective and consequently adjust
to it to improve their ability to effectively communicate in the foreign language.
The ability to communicate effectively in a second language is highly dependent
on the ability to conform to the perspective of the second language (2010: 1), as
reflected in deictic elements. Likewise, L2 learners have to be aware of possible
influences certain grammatical structures have on the mental representation of
text (e.g. passive voice as compared to active voice). Salles Rocha points out that
“professional translators do not only have to be aware of the different perspec-
tives embodied in the language that they are dealing with, but also know how
to take those perspectives when passing from one language into another” (2010:
8). In her study, she compares the organisation of information in descriptive
essay by native and non-native speakers, i.e. American undergraduate students
and mostly Chinese English-language learners, before and after translation ex-
ercises. After the translation exercises the learners got closer to the way native
speakers conveyed information, improving a significant number of thematic and
processual structures (Salles Rocha 2010: 44), in particular their use of material
and mental state processes (2010: 45). The findings indicate the learners gained
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greater awareness of how native speakers compact and organise information
(2010: 45).
In 1989, Miriam Shlesinger launched the two year Translation Skills Program
(TSP) for some secondary schools in Israel. It proposes classes in which students
translate from English (L2) intro Hebrew (L1). In a longitudinal study, Shlesinger
& Almog (2011) investigated the effects of the TSP on students’ metalinguistic
awareness. As a result oft he study the authors consider translation competence
as the interplay between metalinguistic awareness and general language skills:
“Translational proficiency might be thought of as an interplay between bilingual
proficiency and meta-linguistic maturity, involving the recognition of common-
alities and differences in the nature and functions of languages, analysis of lin-
guistic knowledge and control over processing” (Shlesinger & Almog 2011: 164).
Translation scholars predict and observe similar changes in the academic trans-
lation classroom. Dam-Jensen & Heine point out the importance of the text pro-
ducer’s mental state and its interaction with the “situation in which it evolves”
(2013: 91). Author and audience influence this situation. Shreve (2009) empha-
sised the role of the translator’s position regarding these two, suggesting a shift
during the development of translation expertise. According to him, translation
experts focus on the target audience, whereas novices’ attention would solely lie
on the source text. Research by Ehrensberger-Dow & Massey provides evidence
for these predictions. Translation novices in their study use comments on the
readership to solely refer tot he ST readers. In line with Shreve (2009), a more
equilibrated view regarding the implication of others in translation reflects the
emerging awareness of the translator’s position and the multiple roles s/he has
to handle. Again, data by Ehrensberger-Dow & Massey (2013) confirms this pre-
diction. MA students were found to spread their attention “over three categories,
with half of them indicating an awareness of the importance of conveying the
message of the ST and tending to talk about target text readerships” (2013: 111).
In summary, this section provided evidence to support the hypothesis that
translation requires ToM. The translator represents both source and target other
at the same time. Forming these concurrent metarepresentations should hence
activate the ToM network in the brain. Furthermore, frequent exposure to trans-
lation should train ToM.
To test this hypotheses, I compare participants with two different levels of
translation competence: BA and MA students from the Translation Faculty at
the University of Geneva. In the present framework, BA students considered
non-proficient, or novice translators. MA students assumed to have a greater
translation competence due to more training. If it is true that translation in-
430
16 Metaminds: Using metarepresentation to model minds in translation
volves ToM, a translation task should engage the neural ToM network. However,
brain activation patterns should be different for BA and MA students if it is true
that translation trains ToM. That is, I assume different levels of translation com-
petence to be associated with different activation patterns of the ToM network.
Details of the study are presented below.
4 Study
Subjects were presented with 40 German sentences, 20 of which were in a ToM
condition and 20 in a noToM condition. The task consisted in reformulated each
sentence in the same language. This was to avoid noise in the neuroimagery
data due to participants’ different language levels. Two sentences of each con-
dition were matched in terms of sentence construction as to exclude effects due
to linguistic particularities or simple lexical processing. A ToM condition sen-
tence requires participants to take the narrator’s perspective in order to infer
the meaning of the message (e.g. “When I stood on the stage for the very first
time, my palms became wet”). For the noToM condition sentences, the simple
understanding of the sentence’s logic was required (e.g. “When touching that
used towel, my palms became wet”). The resemblance of the sentences should
guarantee that there was no effect linked to any text-statistics factor that would
influence the results (Dodell-Feder et al. 2011).
24 subjects (13 BA, 11 MA) were tested. Functional data were collected on 3T-
MRI scanner (Siemens), analyzed with SPM8 using fixed-effect analysis with a
general linear model applied to each voxel and an auto- regressive function to
account for temporal correlations between them across the whole brain. After-
wards, simple main effects of each condition were subjected to a random-effect
analysis. All conditions were modeled in a full 2x2 factorial model (ANOVA)
with modalities (verbal/ nonverbal) as factor 1 and the condition (ToM/ noToM)
as factor 2.
Participants were asked provide an intralingual translation of the sentence, fo-
cusing on the sentence’s message. The intralingual translation setting was cho-
sen because it allows for a better control of the design, particularly with respect
to possible influences different degrees of language proficiency could have on the
brain activation patterns (Kim et al. 1997; Korning Zethsen 2009). The baseline
task of the verbal condition consisted in reading aloud. As non verbal control
condition, the Mind in the Eyes task was chosen. This test was originally devel-
oped as a diagnostics tool for autism by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). It consists of
a set of pictures showing only the eyes of a person. In the ToM condition, par-
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ticipants have to choose one adjective out of four to describe the expression of
the eyes. The original task was complemented by a no ToM condition consist-
ing in attributing an age to the depicted person, and a baseline task in which
participants have to indicate the location of a red dot placed in the picture.
5 Results and discussion
The ToM-noToM contrast for the verbal task reveals an important activation in
the left middle temporal gyrus, the left precuneus, the left cerebellum, the left
middle inferior temporal gyrus, the left middle temporal gyrus, the left caudate
body, the left subgyral part of the left temporal lobe, the left parahippocampal
gyrus and the right superior temporal gyrus. The interaction analysis for the
ToM-noToM contrast reveals activation in four regions across the non-verbal
and verbal modality: the bilateral precuneus, the right superior frontal gyrus the
inferior temporal gyrus and the left cerebellum.
The hypothesis that translation activates the ToM network can thus be only
partially confirmed since the only ToM area activated by the task is the pre-
cuneus (PC). Despite being an important part of the ToM network, the litera-
ture dedicated to the role of the precuneus is scarce, but it is a major association
area and is implied in numerous behavioural functions, such as visuo-spatial im-
agery, episodic memory retrieval, self-processing and consciousness (Cavanna
& Trimble 2006). Its implication in self-processing seems to be relevant to my
study, because first-person reference (‘I’, ‘my’, ‘me’) was used in all verbal stim-
uli. Could the activation of the PC be due to the participants’ processing of this
self-reference rather than to the translation condition? Experiments revealing
the implication of the precuneus in self-processing have addressed with the rep-
resentation and awareness of the self (Cavanna & Trimble 2006), more precisely
with the representation of self versus non-self representation as in self-referential
judgement and first- versus third-person-perspective-taking. These studies in-
volved tasks in which participants were asked to compare self-relevant traits
with self-irrelevant traits of information (Cavanna & Trimble 2006) by asking
them to make decisions about psychological personality trait adjectives, or at-
tributing personality trait adjectives to themselves (Cavanna & Trimble 2006).
Other studies found activation in the PC when participants were asked to de-
scribe themselves as compared to a neutral reference person (Cavanna & Trimble
2006). Further evidence for the activation of the PC was found in studies asking
the participants to evaluate psychological traits they associated with three peo-
ple with different degrees of self-relevance, namely the person herself, her best
friend and a neutral person (Cavanna & Trimble 2006).
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The studies listed above provide evidence for the fact that activation in the PC
is linked to various forms and degrees of self-reference. However, self-reference
cannot fully account for the PC activation in my study because the nonverbal
task does also requires the first-person-vantage point. Although the latter might
be rather implicit in the nonverbal condition, the task consists of the evalua-
tion of others’ facial expression as seen by me. The choice of answers could
thus be rephrased as ‘To me, he looks aggressive’, or ‘I think she looks flirting’.
First-person agency does thus not depend of the test condition. However, this
factor might be more explicit in the verbal condition, because the personal and
demonstrative pronouns ‘I’, ‘my’ and ‘me’ might trigger a more explicit form of
self-reference than the non verbal condition. The factor of self-reference might
therefore be stronger in the verbal condition as compared to the nonverbal con-
dition.
This view finds further support by an fMRI item-wise analysis of theory of
mind tasks which revealed that the number of people in a story was the best
predictor for activity in the PC. Activation was greater if more people were in-
volved (Dodell-Feder et al. 2011). According to this meta-analysis, the nonverbal
task in my study should have elicited a greater PC activation because it involves
several different people as compared to the translation condition, which features
only one protagonist, the ‘I’. Self-reference cannot explain the activation patterns
found in the present study.
However, PC activation in studies about intergroup conflict seems to be more
elusive with regards to the translation task in my study. Bruneau & Saxe (2010)
found that the activity in the precuneus was strongly correlated with explicit
and implicit behavioural measures of negative attitudes towards the outgroup.
They presented Arab and Israeli participants with statements of partisan views
and measured the BOLD response with fMRI imaging. Only the PC was reli-
ably recruited during emotion- laden reasoning in most individual subjects. Fur-
thermore, only the PC differentiated between pro- ingroup and pro-outgroup
statements across groups. Bruneau & Saxe (2010) provide one of the rare neu-
roimagery studies where implicit associations towards the outgroup have been
studied. Their study is in line with other work about the PC’s implication in
emotional reasoning. PC activation has been reported when participants with
a very strong political orientation were confronted with apparent contradictory
statements made by their own political candidate Bruneau & Saxe (2010).
Similarly, the verbal stimuli used in my study most likely did not reflect the
participants’ own view. The PC activation revealed in the verbal task might thus
reflect the inner conflict of using terms of self- reference such as ‘I’, ‘my’ and ‘me’
without, however, actually referring to oneself (Robinson 2001; Hermans 2007;
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Pym 2005). While using these words, the translator, very clearly, distinguishes
herself from the person whose place she takes while producing these utterances.
The PC activation might thus reflect this inner disparity between intended refer-
ence, i.e., the author, and the actual performing reference, i.e., the translator.
The hypothesis that different levels of translation competencewould be related
to different levels of activation of the ToMnetwork could not be confirmed. There
are three possible explanations to account for this result:
1. There is no difference between both groups.
2. There are differences between the participants, but the actual group dis-
tinction is not a sensitive criterion for them.
3. There are differences between both groups, but the verbal test is not sensi-
tive enough to detect them.
The first point can only be reliably addressed by further testing in terms of neu-
roimagery studies and in terms of other experimental research into the metacog-
nitive proficiency of translators. The second possible explanation could be that
the verbal task is not sensitive enough to reveal group differences for the studied
conditions. The verbal task did not yield any group differences in terms of brain
activation. Similarly, the nonverbal task did not reveal any group difference in
terms of reaction time. Both tasks, the nonverbal and the verbal, yielded a robust
contrast for both conditions (ToM and noToM). The third point could be due to
a ceiling effect in the brain activation. Because all subjects were healthy young
students of a similar age range, the distinction of academic curricula might not
be sensitive with regards to differences in the activation of neural networks.
However, BA students showed a greater activation in the inferior parietal lob-
ule throughout the verbal task. This activation was, however, independent of
condition. The intralingual translation task parallels the results of the validated
nonverbal test design, and therefore seems to be adequate for the testing of con-
ditions. The most plausible explanation may thus be that the group distinction
is not a sensitive criterion to answer the question. It has been observed before
that professional translators do not necessarily produce high quality translations
(Sun & Shreve 2014).
Since the BA/MA distinction may not be sensitive enough a criterion to detect
actual differences in translation competence, a third analysis was conducted for
which participants were regrouped according to the quality ratings of their trans-
lations. This analysis revealed a positive correlation between translation quality
ratings and activity in the precuneus. In other words: greater precuneus activity
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lead to translations which received higher ratings for their quality. This finding
emphasizes the previously discussed role of the precuneus.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that translation requires the metarepresentation of at least two
other mindsets. If this assumption is right, translation should be highly demand-
ing in terms of attributive metacognition; and the latter should account at least
for some of the cognitive load involved in the translator’s task. A second assump-
tion is that frequent exposure to this task trains metacognitive abilities, among
them attributive metacognition, or ToM.
I set up an fMRI study to answer the question whether translation activates
the ToM network. This was the case. However, translation did not activate the
entire ToM network, but only one part of it, the precuneus (PC).This area is most
frequently associated with self-reference, self-processing and awareness of self.
In addition, PC activation has been positively correlated to the number of people
in a story. In the present context, it may indicate the translator’s awareness for
the multiple metarepresentations. ToM stimuli required the representation of
several minds whereas noToM stimuli descriptively reported facts or states of
the world.
Furthermore, the results of the present study indicate a positive correlation
between PC activation and translation quality ratings. Higher PC activation was
linked to higher translation quality. This finding could indicate that successful
attributive metacognition contributes to translation quality.
However, this partial activation of the ToM network does not mean that sub-
jects are consciously aware of textual requirements in terms of attributive meta-
cognition. Existing literature suggests that students’ pragmatic awareness builds
up slowly and is only acquired over time. Since attributive metacognition is only
one part of this pragmatic ability, its development may be even less visible. The
training of metacognitive abilities could also evolve through other translation-
related tasks, like reading or writing fiction. The training of other subcompe-
tences, such as executive function, could also lead to better metacognitive abili-
ties.
On the methodological level, this study attempts to push disciplinary bound-
aries by studying a traditional translation concept like “otherness” with the help
of neuroimagery. The present work shows that neuroimagery research need not
be limited to localising translation in the brain. Transdisciplinary research in
translation does not only further our understanding about translation, but also
our understanding of what it means to be multilingual.
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